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ABSTRACT 
Single packet authorization is a technique that allows shielding a protected network 
service from an outside world. The protection is achieved by hiding the respective transport layer 
port until cryptographically protected packet received by another service authorizes port opening. 
The technique has a known weakness related to the key leakage. If secret key is known to the 
attacker, the shield can be removed by one message. The paper proposes to use a novel 
Honeykeys authorization scheme that is aimed at deceiving the attacker by storing decoy 
cryptographic keys on both server and client sides along with the actual keys. In such scheme, if 
keys are compromised it will not lead to the full-scale system compromise. In addition to that, 
Honeykeys scheme allows establishing segregation of duties in the authorization process and 
enables early detection of compromised keys. Apart from presenting theoretical concept of 
Honeykeys the paper shows preliminary implementation results from the pilot project. These 
results show acceptable authorization delay times imposed by additional security mechanism. 
Keywords: Network Protection, Single Packet Authorization, Deception, Network 
services protection, Authorization, Honeypots  
INTRODUCTION 
Protection of computer networks and services has become a vital function in the modern 
information technology (IT). Elements of the critical infrastructure require reliable protective 
mechanisms to reduce the surface of the potential cyberattacks. One of the known approaches for 
such a protection is to put an additional shield around the administrative entry to the hardened 
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system and to remove this shield temporarily by a secret non-repeatable command when needed.  
One of the examples of such protection for networking services is port knocking 
technique, which was proposed in early 2000s (Barham, et al. 2002), (Krzywinski 2003). The 
technique later evolved into single packet authorization and related approaches discussed in the 
second section of the paper. Port knocking and similar technologies heavily rely on the security 
of the authorization keys. If attacker get access to a compromised port knocking key, then the 
concealed ports cannot be considered protected any more. It is especially true in case if a 
malicious insider is involved in the. This position paper explores the possibility to use deception 
mechanism to detect malicious insider and avoid system compromise. The novelty of the 
proposed approach includes ability to segregate user access rights for three types of users: ones 
who issue commands on the protected system, ones who authorize the commands and ones who 
have access to the cryptographic keys.   
RELATED WORKS I: SINGLE PACKET AUTHORIZATION  
The idea of additional layer for network service protection by hiding the respective port 
was suggested in 2002 in the form of port knocking (Barham, et al. 2002). Firewall closes 
protected ports and there is a daemon on the server which intercepts the incoming packets and 
waits for a set of predefined sequence of port knocks without providing any receipt to sender 
(Barham, et al. 2002). After receiving the predefined sequence, the daemon opens the desired 
port(s) on the firewall so that the connection can be established during a relatively short time 
slot. Although this approach has numerous benefits and had been commonly used by system 
administrators for a variety of security applications (Krzywinski 2003), simple implementations 
of port knocking itself have known issues such as replay attack, out-of-order packet delivery, and 
susceptibility to scanners (Manzanares, et al. 2005).  
Butakov et al. Honeykeys 
 
Proceedings of the 14th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Munich, Germany, December 15, 2019. 3
One of the techniques that evolved from port knocking was Single Packet Authorization 
(SPA) (Rash 2007). In SPA model, the server is also on the default dropstance and monitors the 
incoming packets but SPA has solved many of port knocking issues by using a single encrypted 
authorization UDP packet over the application layer (Rash 2007). SPA has been improved by the 
number of techniques, including, for example, an approach that suggested to use out of band 
communication over mobile network to deliver secondary authorization (Liew, et al. 2010). Such 
approach allows to avoid brute-force attacks on cryptographic keys. Port knocking - based 
techniques become popular protection tool for sensitive networking services. A number of SPA-
based commercial solutions are being offered on the market by such vendors as CryptZone or 
Vidder. Another example of SPA evolution is WebSPA project supported by OWASP (OWASP 
2017) that uses web application to send the authorization payload through properly secured web 
server communication. 
One major problem remains open with SPA and related techniques: compromise of the 
keys by external attacker or malicious insider leads to the single point of failure. If authorization 
key(s) appear in the wrong hands, the SPA layer can be defeated by one single packet and this 
action might not be even noticed by the unsuspecting server that trusts client based on the key(s) 
provided. In such case security of the database with authorization key(s) becomes potentially the 
weakest link and a single point of failure for SPA-based layer of server protection. One potential 
way to address this issue is to use well-known key/password deception mechanisms that would 
help to confuse the potential attacker and also provide early detection mechanisms to alarm the 
server about potentially compromised keys on the client site.  
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RELATED WORKS II: DECEPTION MECHANISMS IN PASSWORD STORAGE 
Deception mechanisms are being used in various security applications. Taxonomy of the 
such mechanisms, provided in (Almeshekah, Spafford and Atallah 2013), shows that they 
include honeypots, DNS re-directions, fake sites, fake keys and accounts, user jailing, anti-
forensics tools and honeytokens in different forms. Honeytokens have been implemented in such 
projects as Kamouflage (Bojinov, et al. 2010) and Honeywords (Juels and Rivest 2013). In these 
two implementations and similar projects decoy passwords are being inserted in the password 
database to deceive potential thieve of credentials. Authentication system uses an additional 
hardened server called Honeychecker to verify if the matching password is real or decoy. In case 
if decoy password is discovered, system may silently switch to the fail-secure mode, trigger an 
alarm and direct potential attacker to the honeypot. Use of decoy passwords has been also 
proposed as part of SAuth authentication scheme (Kontaxis, et al. 2013).  
Two important features are being added by honeywords to improve system security. First 
is the attacker confusion. Attacker needs to choose one of the passwords (hashes) that are stored 
for every user. If decoy passwords are “flat” – e.g. resemble the actual password then the 
attacker’s choice will not be obvious (Juels and Rivest 2013). Second feature is the ability of 
Honeychecker to detect the password database leaks: if improper index is being sent to the 
Honeychecker it is very likely that non-authorized user has access to decoy passwords and thus 
the database with the credentials had been compromised.  
This paper proposes to use similar principle to store secret keys in the Single Packet 
Authorization (SPA) scheme: store decoy keys along with the proper one(-s) and implement 
Honeychecker to verify suitability of the candidate key. The following section outlines 
Honeykeys: a novel approach to SPA security that is using technique similar to honeywords in 
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order to add the following features to SPA security: protection from key leakage and segregation 
of duties for sensitive authorization operations.  
USING HONEYKEYS IN SINGLE PACKET AUTHORIZATION 
Deception mechanisms are being used in various security applications. Taxonomy of the 
such mechanisms, provided in  (Almeshekah and Spafford 2014), shows that they include 
honeypots, DNS re-directions, fake sites, fake keys and accounts, user jailing, anti-forensics 
tools and honeytokens in different forms. This research is proposing to use honeytokens to 
improve security of authentication mechanisms in SPA. Formal model for the proposed protocol 
includes 9 elements each of which knows only certain pieces of information as per the table 
below: 
Table 1. Elements of the system and information available to them  
Element of the system  Known information  
Key administrator (KA) {PubK}, 
{PrivK}, 
{PIN} 
- set of public keys used for authorization 
- set of private keys used for authorization  
- set of potential PINs 
SPA Client (SC):  {PubK}  
SPA Server (SS):  {PrivK}  
Authorizing User (AuthU):  {PIN}, 
PINsecret 
 
Honeychecker (HC): PINsecret - secret PIN used for authorization 
Application User (AppU):  PINsecret  
Firewall (FW): --  -- 
Protected Service (PS):  -- 
Honeypot / Decoy Service (HD):  -- 
The information flow in the proposed approach is represented in figure 1. The diagram 
includes the following main elements:  
o Users. There are three groups of users: 1) Authorizing user (AuthU). Role of the 
Authorizing user is to insert PINsecret into Honeychecker database and share same PINsecret with 
the Application User (AppU). PINsecret represents the index of the actual key in the database. All 
other keys considered decoy keys. In the simplest case, PIN could be a sequential index of the 
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key in the key storage.  2) Key administrator (KA). Role of this user is to generate cryptographic 
key pairs {PubK} and {PrivK} and subsequently transfer {PubK} to SC and {PrivK} keys to the 
SPA Server (SS). To simplify the picture the role of KA is not represented on the Figure 1. 
3) Application user. Role of the user is to input PINsecret in the system and send authorization 
package to allow application to connect to protected system. As it can be seen from the 
description of the roles, proposed authorization scheme allows segregating duties of KA and 
AuthU.  In case if KA is compromised, the system still stays in much more secure mode than a 
typical SPA-based system as KA role does not know the PINsecret  thus imposter will face the risk 
of detection.  
o SPA Server (SS) receives SPA packet, finds if the packet is decryptable with one 
of the {PrivK} keys and if yes verify index of the key with the HC. In case of positive 
verification from the HC SPA Server opens access to the Router.   
o SPA client (SC) allows AU to select one of the private keys by PINsecret and send 
authorization packet to the SS to enable Application access to the Protected system.  
o Honeycheker (HC) keeps the PINsecret provided by an AuthU. It verifies if index 
submitted by SS matches the PINsecret and in case of match sends authorization back to SS. If 
index does not match, it may generate positive or negative answer to the SS depending on the 
selected mode of operations and generates an alarm to the Router.   
Proposed Honeykeys authorization scheme provides the following advantages: 
o Segregation of duties allows protection from the malicious insider. Unlike in the 
original SPA scheme, case of compromised key administrator does not lead to the compromise 
of the system. Compromised key administrator may insert non-matching private/public key pairs 
thus leading to the denial of service but the Protected system still stays shielded from the outside 
Butakov et al. Honeykeys 
 
Proceedings of the 14th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Munich, Germany, December 15, 2019. 7
world.  In the same manner, compromised authorizing user (ZU) and application user do not 
have direct access to the keys stored in the application. 
 
Figure 1. Information flow in the proposed protocol  
o Since private and public keys on both SPA client and SPA server are essentially 
random sequences there is no way for the attacker to guess which key “looks” like the proper 
one. Based on that it can be stated that the problem of creating “flat” decoy keys 
\cite{juels2013honeywords} is not relevant to the proposed scheme.  
o All the advantages of the original SPA, such as confidentiality of the message or 
protection against replay attack are inherited in the proposed Honeykeys scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The paper proposed Honeykeys - a novel authentication scheme for Single Packet 
Authorization (SPA) that uses decoy passwords to add additional layer of protection against the 
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potential loss of the cryptographic keys. Such addition allows establishing additional layer of 
protection against malicious insiders by enabling early warnings on the keys leakage and ability 
to silently re-route an attacker to the honeypot. In addition, Honeykeys authorization allows 
separation of secret key administrator duties from authorizing person and application user. As a 
step to continue the research authors are working on the experimental software for proposed 
changes in the SPA authorization scheme. Another direction for further research will be to 
extend the protocol to multi-user and multi-command arrangements as well as adding key 
rotation mechanisms to deal with potential replay attacks.   
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